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Abstract
We model a situation in which a single firm evaluates competing suppliers and selects just one.
Suppliers submit bids involving both price and quality variables. The buyer makes a choice which from
the supplier’s perspective appears to contain a stochastic element — for example the buyer may have
information, which is not shared with the suppliers, and that gives one supplier an advantage in the final
choice. We use a discrete choice model of buyer choice (e.g. multinomial logit). Our main result is that
the supplier’s choice of the quality variables is not aﬀected by the competitive environment. Thus the
suppliers compete only on price. We compare this with a second model in which the buyer’s weighting
on diﬀerent quality variables is uncertain at the time bids are made.
1 Introduction
Selecting the right supplier is a critical strategic decision for many firms. Typically a group of managers will
carefully evaluate the merits of competing suppliers, looking at a variety of factors in making their choice.
There will inevitably be trade-oﬀs to be made between price and other variables such as reliability, and
delivery time. Our aim in this paper is to investigate the way that suppliers compete for contracts when
bids are made that involve several factors. An understanding of this will help us to determine the amount
of information to be released by the buying firm. Is there an advantage to the buyer in revealing ahead of
time the weightings that will be given to diﬀerent factors or the exact way that scoring rules will operate,
or will it be better to keep this information private?
The usual approach when firms select a supplier is some combination of competitive bidding and nego-
tiations (Monczka et al. 2009, p. 55). The first step in a competitive bidding process is for the buyer to
send a ‘request for quotation’ (RFQ) to a number of potential suppliers (there may be some pre-qualification
stage to determine this set of companies). On receiving these quotations the most common decision method
for the buyer is to use a weighted point system that includes a variety of performance categories, a weight
1
associated with each category, and a scale enabling each supplier to be awarded a score within each cate-
gory. The category scores are then added up using the predetermined weights and this final score is used
to find an overall winner. For example, Chrysler uses cross-functional teams to determine the weights of
four performance categories (i.e., cost, quality, technology, and delivery) and to evaluate a supplier’s overall
qualification (Trent 2007, p. 60). We have found a similar approach used by a multinational paper tissue and
hygiene products manufacturer when selecting a packaging supplier. Essentially the same process can also
be used in an online auction. Either as a replacement for competitive bidding or following an initial bidding
process, the buyer may enter into negotiation with one or more potential suppliers. Direct negotiation,
without a competitive bidding stage, is appropriate when there are very few (if any) alternative suppliers
available, or there is great uncertainty associated with some aspects of the bid (such as required performance
or technology) and these uncertainties will be resolved as part of the negotiation.
The approaches used in the private sector are matched by those in the public sector. For example in the
European Union there are specific requirements for public procurement of large contracts. These must be
advertised widely and the announcements must include some specific weighting amongst attributes in any
case where a lowest price mechanism is not being used. The principal here is that the selection of a “most
economically advantageous tender” should be made on the basis of objective criteria and with a methodology
that “is established in an objective and non-discriminatory manner and accessible to all interested parties”
(see the European Commission document of December 2011 on a Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament on Public Procurement, COM/2011/0896 final).
Many empirical studies have examined important factors in supplier selection (see Dickson 1966 for an
early example) and researchers have applied diﬀerent multi-objective decision making approaches. Weber
et al. (1991) review 74 articles on supplier selection up to 1991, finding that most supplier selection decisions
involve the consideration of multiple objectives (such as net price, delivery and quality). Their work indicates
that the most widely used approach in the literature has been linear weighting models, although some
researchers have used mathematical programming models and statistical/probabilistic approaches. A more
recent survey by Ho et al. (2010) indicates that the most important criterion for evaluating bids is quality,
followed by delivery, price/cost, manufacturing capability, service, etc. They note the increased attention
paid to Data Envelopment Analysis in the literature, however the use of scoring on multiple criteria and
then combining these scores using linear weights remains the primary approach in practice. We base our
models on the weighted points system including price and a number of non-price attributes.
A number of researchers have considered the design of auction mechanisms in a multi-attribute supplier
bidding environment. The connection between auction theory and supplier selection is intuitive since pro-
curement is a reverse auction process where competitive suppliers bid on multi-attributes (e.g., price, quality,
etc.) for a purchase contract from the buyer. Moreover, auction theory can be used to address uncertainty
facing both sides (i.e., suppliers and the buyer). Many researchers have worked on multi-dimensional auctions
to find optimal auction mechanisms in specific contexts, such as cost-time bidding for highway construction
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projects (Herbsman et al. 1995), price-quantity bidding in the electricity market (Parisio and Bosco 2003),
and multi-attribute auctions in public procurement (Simon and Melese 2011). In the supplier selection con-
text, Che (1993) and Branco (1997) characterize scoring auctions with two dimensions where suppliers submit
oﬀers on price and quality and the buyer evaluates the bids using a scoring rule. The scoring rule could be a)
first-score such that the supplier with the highest score wins and his/her oﬀer is finalized as the contract, or
b) second-score where the supplier with the highest score wins and is required to match the highest rejected
score in the final contract, or c) second-preferred-oﬀer which is the same as second-score auction except that
the winning firm has to match not only the score but also the exact quality oﬀered by the highest losing
supplier. As an extension of the two-dimension auctions, Chen-Ritzo et al. (2005) experimentally examine
three-attribute auctions when suppliers bid on price, quality and delivery time. Although the majority of
research in this area assumes one-dimensional private information at suppliers’ side (e.g., suppliers’ marginal
costs of quality), Asker and Cantillon (2008) and Asker and Cantillon (2010) model scoring auctions where
suppliers have multi-dimensional private information (e.g., marginal cost of quality and fixed cost). We are
interested in the suppliers’ decisions when there is uncertainty on the buyer’s behavior.
Other research has looked more closely at the supply chain coordination issues. Some researchers have
designed optimal auction mechanism and procurement contract for the buyer in the same context as ours
where a number of suppliers compete for the procurement contract from a single buyer. Cachon and Zhang
(2006) investigate several bidding mechanisms when the suppliers bid on price and lead time, and the buyer
awards the contract to the supplier who minimizes the sum of (the buyer’s) procurement and operation costs
based on an estimate of suppliers’ costs. Chen (2007) considers a sole sourcing problem when both purchase
quantity and price need to be determined, finding that the buyer’s optimal procurement strategy can be
achieved by embedding a supply contract within an auction mechanism, i.e., the buyer first design a supply
contract that specifies a payment for each possible purchase quantity and then invites suppliers to bid for
this contract on an up-front, lump-sum fee they are willing to pay (for this business opportunity), with the
winner being the supplier oﬀering the highest fee; only the winning supplier pays an up-front fee and has
the right to decide on the quantity produced and delivered. Note that the focus of this stream of literature
is still on the buyer’s decisions.
We will focus on the suppliers’ decisions and our model represents a situation in which the buyer uses a
scoring rule evaluating the bid on a number of characteristics and forming a linear weighting of these. We
suppose that there is a single (sealed bid) auction for the work and we do not consider any later negotiations
with the winning bidder. Suppliers have some uncertainty as to how their bids will be assessed. We consider
two diﬀerent types of uncertainty. First we suppose that in addition to considering the bids themselves the
buyer also scores the suppliers as firms independent of the details of the bids. Thus for example the buyer
may assess the overall reliability of a firm independent of the information in the bid. We suppose that these
assessments are opaque to the supplier. On occasion these type of scores may emerge from discussions within
the buying team during the process of evaluating bids, and thus may not be available even to the buyer at
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the time that bids are made. The second type of uncertainty we consider relates to the utility function of the
buyer as reflected in the weighting on diﬀerent attributes of the bid. We model a case in which the suppliers
have information giving a distribution over weights assigned for quality variables rather than knowing these
explicitly.
Notice that the existence of either type of uncertainty will enable equilibria to exist in which the expected
profit to the suppliers is much greater than it would be in the case without uncertainty. If suppliers have
full information on the way that the winning bid is selected, then the only pure strategy equilibrium will be
one in which the cheapest supplier submits a bid just undercutting the second cheapest supplier. (In this
paper we will assume that suppliers diﬀer in the cost involved in providing diﬀerent levels of quality). When
suppliers have relatively similar costs then in eﬀect they bid away any profit that might be made on this
contract.
There is a close connection between our models and some product diﬀerentiation models where two or
more firms compete for market share through vertical product diﬀerentiation (e.g., qualities). The expected
market share of each firm in product diﬀerentiation models resembles the probability of a supplier being cho-
sen in our model, which means that we can translate the profit function for a supplier in our model of bidding
for a contract directly into the profit function for a firm oﬀering a product into a market place, with diﬀerent
structures for the uncertainty in buyer choice being paralleled by diﬀerent structures in the heterogeneous
preferences amongst consumers. There is a considerable marketing literature that relates to decisions on
produce quality by competing firms, see (Moorthy 1988, Vandenbosch and Weinberg 1995, Chambers, Kou-
velis, and Semple 2006, Lauga and Ofek 2011). Product diﬀerentiation models are particularly concerned
with a situation in which consumers place diﬀerent values on a quality attribute and the distribution of
consumer preferences will determine the positioning decisions made by firms. The marketing literature has
given attention to the product choices made by identical (or very similar firms): one fundamental question,
which goes back to the work of Hotelling, is whether an equilibrium will have firms oﬀering products that
are similar to each other or very diﬀerent. Our interests, however, are more in a situation where firms diﬀer
in the costs associated with diﬀerent levels of quality, and this will drive product diﬀerentiation. The most
significant diﬀerence between the model we give for supplier competition and the usual models for product
diﬀerentiation is that product diﬀerentiation models adopt a two-stage equilibrium framework: in the first
stage, each firm makes a product diﬀerentiation decision, on say quality, simultaneously with the competi-
tors, and fixes it; in the second stage, each firm, having observed the competitors’ qualities, chooses a price
for its product, simultaneously with the competitors. This framework is often appropriate in a marketing
context where price decisions are made last but is hardly tenable in a sealed bidding context since suppliers
need to bid on all attributes (including qualities and prices) simultaneously and privately. In this paper we
explore the connection between equilibrium results in a one-stage and a two-stage framework.
We consider two research questions. Firstly we ask what the equilibrium choices will be for suppliers
in competition with each other who each need to choose price and quality variables in their bids, but
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are uncertain about the precise weights or scores that will be assigned by the buyer. Secondly we ask how
information on weights and scoring methods revealed by the buyer may aﬀect the outcomes and in particular
the amount of profit made by the suppliers.
Our main result is that in the case where scores for bid attributes are uncertain, it is optimal for each
supplier to bid the non-price variables in a way that is independent of the competitive situation. Non-price
variables should be bid at the values that would be chosen if there were no other bidders involved. This result
holds with remarkable generality (independent of the distribution of the uncertainty and only requiring cost
functions to be convex). However, the same result does not hold for the case where there is no uncertainty
in relation to the scores, but instead the weights on bid attributes are uncertain at the time when bids are
submitted.
For examples with particular cost functions we have explored equilibrium solutions in more detail. We find
that smaller uncertainty leads to lower prices and lower profits for the suppliers. More accurate information
released by the buyer, prior to the suppliers making bids, will increase the competitiveness of the bidding and
lead ultimately to lower expected profits for the suppliers and a more favorable outcome for the buyer. In
the extreme case of perfect information, with each supplier knowing both its own and others’ cost functions,
and also knowing the weighting given to diﬀerent quality variables, then an equilibrium will typically have
the cheapest supplier winning the work at a price just below the price at which any other supplier can make
money.
The paper is essentially divided into two , with diﬀerent types of uncertainty being investigated in Section
2 and Section 3. Section 2 presents our first model in which scores for certain bid attributes are uncertain,
and in Section 3 we investigate a second model where there is no uncertainty in relation to the scores, but
buyer weights are uncertain at the time when bids are submitted.
2 Uncertainty in firm scores
We consider a situation in which a buyer has to select one amongst  alternative suppliers, (indexed by ).
Each supplier makes a bid consisting of a price  and the levels for a set of  quality variable 1 2 .
Our assumption is that the buyer converts the quality level  into a score (), and then a weight 
is applied. If the buyer’s utility is separable and the scoring function  is a multiple of the utility for the
’th quality variable, then this can be thought of as a transformation of the original quality measure to get
rid of any nonlinearity from the point of view of the buyer’s utility. Thus we assume that the buyer has a
separable linear utility function, with the utility from a bid ( 1 2 ) given by P=1 ()− .
We will assume that the suppliers have knowledge of the weights  that will be applied to diﬀerent
quality variables, but there is some uncertainty on the scoring functions . From the supplier’s perspective
they can make a specific bid without being certain of exactly how it will be scored. We call this the score-
uncertainty model and we assume additive uncertainty, so that the supplier sets a quality variable  and
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receives a score () = e() +  where we use e for the scoring function that is the best guess of
the supplier. However it is somewhat clumsy to carry around the notation e, thus instead of explicitly
recognizing the estimated scoring functions e, we will simply write  to mean e(). Thus  is not the
actual quality variable (which might be measured in say parts per million defects) but the estimated score
associated with that variable (often measured as a number between 1 and 10).
It is convenient to introduce a constant  representing the base utility that the buyer receives from
the good or service being supplied. Now if supplier  submits a bid ( 1 2 ) and the (supplier)
uncertainty associated with the ’th score is  then the utility obtained by the buyer from accepting this
bid is given by
( z) = +
X
=1
 −  + 
The ‘noise’ variable  is a random variable unknown to the supplier at the time bids are made, and is given
by
 =
X
=1

where  is the uncertainty on the part of supplier  in respect to the score that the buyer will give for the
’th quality variable.
There may well be scores given for variables that do not explicitly form part of the bid. For example
the buyer may make an evaluation of the reliability of the supplier on the basis of reputation or previous
business dealings, rather than on the basis of statements made within the bid documents. This situation
can be handled by forcing the corresponding  value to be zero (or, equivalently, taking the cost of achieving
any change in this  value as infinite).
Assuming that the buyer maximizes its utility, the probability of a particular bid being accepted is
determined by the bids made by other suppliers together with the distribution of the unobserved portion 
in the buyer’s utility function.
This framework incorporates the standard discrete choice model in which a buyer makes a choice from
amongst the choice set of all suppliers’ bids. Discrete choice models have been widely used for product
diﬀerentiation in marketing research, since the discrete choice approach provides a good framework for
describing the demands for diﬀerentiated products (Anderson et al. 1992). There is an increasing interest
in using discrete choice models to describe supplier selection problems in the management literature (see
(Verma and Pullman 1998, Gans 2002) and (Anderson et al. 2011) for examples).The easiest and most widely
used discrete choice model is logit which assumes that the unobserved part of the utility has an extreme
value distribution, i.e. the density for  is  () = −−− . With the logit model the choice probabilities
have succinct, closed-form expressions (McFadden (1974)): the probability of supplier  winning the contract
is
 ( z) = exp(
P
=1  − )P
=1 exp(
P
=1  − ) 
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We suppose that bidders wish to maximize their expected profits. The quality variables are each asso-
ciated with a cost function, with diﬀerent suppliers having diﬀerent costs. Thus the cost for supplier  to
achieve a level  for quality variable  (strictly for the score for this quality variable) is given by ().
We assume that each  is diﬀerentiable convex and increasing. The profit made if supplier  wins the
contract with a bid of ( 1 2 ) is
 −
X
=1
()
The expected profit is obtained by multiplying this by the probability of being selected.
We suppose that the other bids are given and calculate the bid for supplier  which maximizes the
expected profit
Π = ( −
X
=1
())( z)
where ( ) is the probability that the bid ( ) is accepted. We can calculate ( ) by looking at
the probability that this bid has the largest utility for the buyer. Thus
( ) = Pr
" X
=1
 −  +   max 6=
Ã X
=1
 −  + 
!#

We will assume that each of the random variables  have a continuous distribution over their support, so
that there is a zero probability of utilities being equal.
In this model we assume that each firm has full information regarding its own costs, the cost functions
for the other firms, and the noise distributions.
Define a random variable  = max 6= (P=1  −  + )− and suppose that  has a cumulative
distribution function  and density function . Thus
( z) = 
Ã X
=1
 − 
!

2.1 One-stage equilibrium
We first examine the equilibrium in the one-stage framework where the suppliers make decisions on price and
quality simultaneously. We begin by determining the first order conditions for a maximum of the expected
profit Π . We obtain
−( −
X
=1
())
Ã X
=1
 − 
!
+ 
Ã X
=1
 − 
!
= 0 (1)
( −
X
=1
())
Ã X
=1
 − 
!
− 0()
Ã X
=1
 − 
!
= 0,  = 1 2  (2)
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We will assume that the base utility  is suﬃciently large that at the optimum the buyer has positive utility
from the oﬀer. Hence, using (1) to substitute for  in (2) we obtain
( −
X
=1
())
Ã X
=1
 − 
!
[ − 0()] = 0  = 1 2 
We may assume that  P=1 () (since otherwise the supplier makes no money) and also we may
assume that the bid is placed with values that make it lie within the range in which it may be chosen. This
last condition translates into a requirement that  (P=1  − )  0. Hence the first order condition
for a maximum is that each  is chosen so that
0() = 
These values of  can then be used in (1) to determine  and we obtain the following result.
Theorem 1 Suppose that () is strictly convex and let ∗ be defined by
0(∗) =   = 1 2 (3)
If the equation

Ã X
=1
∗ − 
!
= ( −
X
=1
(∗))
Ã X
=1
∗ − 
!
(4)
has a single solution ∗ , then the optimal bid for firm  is (∗  ∗1 ∗2 ∗).
Proof
We have already shown that the required first-order conditions are satisfied for  at the points ∗
defined by (3), and (4) is taken directly from the first order conditions (1). The statement of the theorem
with  strictly convex will ensure that there is only one solution to the first order conditions. So it only
remains to check the second order conditions.
To shorten the expressions we let  = P=1  −  be that part of the buyer’s utility known to
supplier  given a bid of ( ). For small values of  the left hand side of equation (1) is positive. Given
the uniqueness of the zero point (4) we can deduce that the derivative with respect to  at the solution
point is negative, i.e.
( −
X
=1
()) 0 ()− 2 () = 
2Π
2  0
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Now we consider the other second derivatives.
2Π
 = −( −
X
=1
()) 0 () + 0() () +  ()
= 
"
2 ()− ( −
X
=1
()) 0 ()
#
= − 
2Π
2 
2Π
 = ( −
X
=1
()) 0 ()− 0() ()− 0() ()
= 
"
( −
X
=1
()) 0 ()− 2 ()
#
=  
2Π
2 
2Π
2 = ( −
X
=1
())2 0 ()− 20() ()− 00() ()
= 2 
2Π
2 − 
00() () ≤ 2 
2Π
2 
In the last inequality we have used the convexity of . To show that the Hessian is negative definite consider
the quadratic form  where  = (0 1) with 0 corresponding to . Then
 ≤ 
Ã
20 −
X
=1
0 +
X
=1
X
=1

!
=   0
where  = (−0 11 22 ) and  = 2Π2 . Hence the Hessian is negative definite and we
have established the required result. ¥
This theorem concerns the optimal choice of quality and price for a supplier knowing the bids of the other
suppliers. The result shows that the quality levels chosen are independent of the competitive environment
(i.e. the number or aggressiveness of other bids). This independence of quality choice from competitive
factors is striking and we will see that it is not a property that holds in our second model of uncertainty in
weights. Clearly this property of the best response will carry over into any Nash equilibrium. Notice that
∗ , implicitly defined by (4), contains dependence on the other bids  and  through the definition of the
distribution .
Notice that the quality levels occurring in equilibrium are exactly those that optimize expected supply
chain utility in the case of a single supplier. If the buyer ends up using supplier  then the supply chain
utility is
+
X
=1
 +  −
X
=1
()
and this is maximized by taking the ∗ defined by (3).
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2.2 Two-stage equilibrium
In the two-stage equilibrium framework, the competition between firms occurs in two stages. The extra
complications of this model make an analysis more diﬃcult and we will restrict ourselves to a duopoly. In
the first stage, each firm chooses a product quality, simultaneously with the other firm, and fixes it. In the
second stage, each firm, having observed the other’s quality, chooses a price for its product, simultaneously
with the other firm. Given the structure of moves, we define the equilibrium in two steps, starting with the
price equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium in prices is simply a price for supplier  and a price for supplier 
such that neither firm wishes to choose a diﬀerent price unilaterally. Necessarily, this price equilibrium will be
a function of the qualities chosen in the first stage. The subgame-perfect quality equilibrium is a quality for
supplier  and supplier  such that neither supplier would choose a diﬀerent quality unilaterally, recognizing
that the profitability of all quality selections will be determined on the basis of the price equilibrium that
follows.
We will show that, subject to a single non-restrictive additional assumption, the two stage equilibrium
will match the one stage equilibrium that we have already developed.
Let 0  0 and 0  0 be the one stage equilibrium solution. Clearly given quality choices 0 and 0 the
0 values will be an equilibrium so we have
∗ (0  0 ) = 0 and ∗ (0  0 ) = 0 .
So in order to show that the equilibria are the same we have to show that varying  from this value cannot
produce an improvement in the payoﬀ to player . This might happen if varying  produced a change in ∗ .
(In the case where changing  produces no change in ∗ then the optimality of 0  0 against 0  0 shows
the property we need.) Thus we will need to establish that ∗  = 0.
We let  be the random variable  −  and let  be the distribution of  and we write  for its
density. We can reverse the roles of  and  to obtain a random variable  = −, with a distribution
function () = 1−(−). The profit values are given by
Π =
Ã
 −
X
=1
()
!

Ã X
=1
( − )−  + 
!

Π = ( −
X
=1
())
Ã
1−
Ã X
=1
( − )−  + 
!!

The condition we will need is that the following inequality holds for all choices of  in the support of :
2()2 − 0 ()()  0 (5)
This will be true for most distributions of the error terms. It is easily seen to be true whenever 0() ≤ 0,
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so we need only consider  values where 0()  0. We can check that the condition holds when  and 
are identically distributed with either a uniform, normal or extreme value distribution.
Theorem 2 Suppose that () is strictly convex, and the condition (5) holds. If there is an equilibrium
in the single stage problem then this solution will also be a (subgame perfect) equilibrium for the two stage
problem where prices are determined after quality levels are set.
Proof
Suppose that quality levels have already been fixed, then the equilibrium prices ∗ and ∗ respectively
optimize Π and Π and are chosen as the solutions to the pair of first order conditions
−
Ã
 −
X
=1
()
!

Ã X
=1
( − )−  + 
!
+
Ã X
=1
( − )−  + 
!
= 0 (6)
−
Ã
 −
X
=1
()
!

Ã X
=1
( − )−  + 
!
+ 1−
Ã X
=1
( − )−  + 
!
= 0 (7)
Now we consider the best choice of the  variables. We look for first order conditions recognizing that ∗
and ∗ depend on the  values. (we write ∗ () for ∗ (1  1  ) and similarly for ∗ () Taking
derivatives of Π with respect to  we get
Ã
∗ ()−
X
=1
()
!

Ã X
=1
( − )− ∗ () + ∗ ()
!
( − ∗  + ∗ )
+ (∗  − 0()
Ã X
=1
( − )− ∗ () + ∗ ()
!
= 0
Then substituting from (6) and cancelling the common term we obtain
 + ∗  − 0() = 0,
The next step is to evaluate ∗ . It will be helpful to write  =
P
=1 ( − )− ∗ () + ∗ ().
We take derivatives with respect to  of (6) and this gives (after substituting 0() =  + ∗  )
−
Ã
∗ ()−
X
=1
()
!
0 ( ) ( − ∗  + ∗ )− (∗  −  − ∗ ) ( )
+  ( ) ( − ∗  + ∗ ) = 0
Thus
( − ∗  + ∗ )
Ã
2( )− 0 ( )
Ã
 −
X
=1
()
!!
= 0
11
Using (6) we see that the second term can be rewritten
2( )− 0 ( ) ( )( ) 
and this is positive from our assumption that (5) holds. Thus we have shown that
 − ∗  + ∗  = 0 (8)
Now we take derivatives with respect to  of (7) and this gives
−(−
X
=1
())0 ( ) (−∗ +∗ )−(∗ ) ( )− ( ) (−∗ +∗ ) = 0
Using (8) shows that ∗  = 0 which is the condition we need to show that the ∗ is given by the
solution to
0(∗) = 
Thus the two stage equilibrium matches the solution we have found for the one stage problem. The normal
check that we would make for second derivative conditions is unnecessary here because the required property
follows from the fact of this being an equilibrium in the single stage case. ¥
2.3 Choosing uncertainty levels: An example
It is often the case that a buyer can choose the level of uncertainty within which supplier bids are made.
Now we ask whether some uncertainty is beneficial for the buyer. We cannot give any general results but we
can use our characterization of the equilibrium to explore specific cases.
Suppose that there are two firms  and  and a single quality variable . Firm  has a cost of quality
given by () = 22 and firm  has a cost of quality () = 32. Thus firm  has a lower cost to achieve a
given level of quality. The buyer’s weighting on quality is  = 2, which equates to $2 benefit for each unit
increase in .
Then our result shows that firm  bids a quality level satisfying 4 = 2, i.e. ∗ = 12 with a cost of 12.
Similarly ∗ = 13 with a cost of 13. In order to calculate an equilibrium we need to specify the distribution
of  and  . For simplicity of exposition we suppose that both  and  are uniformly distributed over
[− ]. Then
 = ∗ −  +  − 
and
() = Pr(2
3
−  +  −   )
12
Given the distributions of  and  , the distribution function of  −  can be easily derived. It has a
triangular density function centred at 0 over the range (−2 2). Let Θ() and () be the cdf and density
function for the triangular distribution over this range. Thus () = Θ(− 23+) and () = (− 23+).
Similarly () = Θ(− 1 + ). The equations defining ∗ and ∗ are, from (4),
(1− ) =
µ
 − 1
2
¶
(1− )

µ
2
3
− 
¶
=
µ
 − 1
3
¶

µ
2
3
− 
¶

These can be rewritten
Θ () =
µ
 − 1
2
¶
 ()  (9)
Θ (−) =
µ
 − 1
3
¶
 (−) 
where  = (13)−  +  
By the symmetry of the triangular distribution we have  () =  (−). Now suppose   0. This implies
Θ ()  Θ (−) and hence  − (12)   − (13) i.e.  −   −16 which contradicts   0. Thus we
have shown   0. Now we can derive from the two equations (9), after some algebra, that
 = 36+ 1−
p
(36)2 − 24+ 1
24

∗ = 23 + −
3
2
 ∗ = 13 + −
1
2

Thus
∗ − ∗ = 7− 36+
p
(36− 13)2 + (89)
24
 0
so supplier  who has a cost advantage associated with quality always charges a higher price than the
competitor.
We can find from this the expected profits at equilibrium for the two suppliers, Π∗ and Π∗ , as well as the
expected utility for the buyer, which we write as Π∗.
Π∗ = 12
µ
∗ − 12
¶2µ
1− 
2
¶

Π∗ = 12
µ
∗ − 13
¶2µ
1− 
2
¶

Π∗ = + 12
µ
∗ − 12
¶µ
1− 
2
¶
 +
µ
2
3
− ∗
¶

The expected profits are plotted in Figure 1 for  = 05. The most important feature is that reducing the
degree of uncertainty makes the equilibrium more competitive in general, leading to a better result for the
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Figure 1: Variation in profit for the butyer and two suppliers as the range of uncertainty changes
buyer. In this case, for small  supplier  makes almost no profit. However it is interesting that there is a
small increase in profit for supplier  at low values of . This is associated with a small loss of utility for the
buyer when the uncertainty  is set very low. Buyer utility is maximized at  = 00237. The intuition for
this is as follows. Starting from a position of no uncertainty (the buyer reveals everything to the suppliers) a
small increase in uncertainty will cause the low cost supplier to drop their bid price a little in order to ensure
that there is no chance for the high price supplier to win the bid. This results in a marginally higher profit
for the buyer. However this happens for a relatively small range of values. Once uncertainty exceeds this,
then the increased uncertainty makes it impossible for either player to be sure of beating the other and bid
prices start to increase with uncertainty. We can say that with larger amounts of uncertainty there is less
and less point in the suppliers behaving competitively and the price paid by the buyer increases steadily.
A more realistic case has errors following a normal distribution where the degree of uncertainty is deter-
mined by the standard deviation . Though it is no longer possible to give closed-form solutions, we can
carry out a numerical study and find broadly similar results. Reducing the uncertainty will generally lead
to better results for the buyer. There will be a value of the standard deviation, say ∗, that maximizes the
buyer profit. In the case with normally distributed errors we may find ∗ = 0, but this only occurs when
the two firms have very similar costs, and in most cases ∗ is a small positive number.
3 Uncertainty on buyer weights
Now we turn to our second model of uncertainty which reflects a situation in which suppliers are uncertain
about the weights that the buyer will assign to diﬀerent quality variables. We call this the weight-uncertainty
model. As before the buyer selects from amongst  alternative suppliers, where supplier  bids a price  and
 quality variables 1 2 . As in the score-uncertainty model the  values here shoudl be thought of as
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the scores the buyer will assign rather than absolute levels of quality. Since there is no longer any uncertainty
in these scores (captured by  which occurred in the score-uncertainty model), the buyer accepting the bid
from supplier  will receive a utility ( ) =  +P=1  − . In this model, however, we suppose
that the exact values of  are unknown to the suppliers, and instead we assume that the  are drawn from
a known distribution. Other assumptions made in Section 2 continue to hold and in particular we assume
that each  is diﬀerentiable, strictly convex and increasing.
Let ( ) be the probability that the bid ( ) is accepted. We calculate ( ) by looking at the
probability that this bid has the largest utility. Thus
( ) = Pr
" X
=1
 −   max 6=
Ã X
=1
 − 
!#

We shall assume that the random variables  have continuous distributions over their support so that there
is zero probability of utilities being equal. We will also assume that the constant  is large enough for all
the bids to give the buyer a positive utility.
As we will see this model is more complex to analyze and we will explore the behavior of the supplier
bids through looking in detail at the case where there is just one quality variable  and two suppliers,  and
. Without loss of generality, we assume that    . The probability of supplier  being selected is
( ) = Pr( −    − ) (10)
We suppose that  has a cumulative distribution function  and density function . Thus,
( ) = Pr(   −  −  ) = 1−()
where we define  = (−)(−). Also the probability of supplier  being chosen is (  ) = ().
The expected supplier profits are given by Π = ( − ())( ) and Π = ( − ())(  ).
The first order conditions at an equilibrium give
−( − ())() 1 −  + 1−() = 0 (11)
 − 
( − )2()( − ())− 
0()(1−()) = 0 (12)
−( − ())() 1 −  +() = 0 (13)
 − 
( − )2()( − ())− 
0()() = 0 (14)
In addition to these first order local conditions we also need to check that neither bidder can do better
by undercutting the other bidder at their quality choice. The situation is illustrated in Figure 2 where the
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Figure 2: Possibility of undercutting the other supplier at the same quality level may break an equilibrium.
support of  is given by (0 1), i.e. 0 and 1 are respectively the lowest and highest weights that may
occur. At an equilibrium we may assume that  ∈ [0 1] since otherwise one of the suppliers has no chance
of winning the bid, and can only gain by lowering its price  to bring  into the specified range. For an
equilibrium however we need to check that supplier  cannot improve by moving its bid to the position 
just below supplier ’s oﬀer (or similarly supplier  moving to position ). The conditions to ensure this
are:
( − ())(1−())   − () (15)
( − ())()   − () (16)
Substituting (11) into (12) and (13) into (14), we obtain
0() = 0() =  −  −  =  (17)
Subtracting (11) from (13) and substitute with (17), we deduce
 −  = ()() − 1 + 2()(()− ()) (18)
To solve this we define functions (·) = (0)−1(·) and (·) = (0)−1(·) which give  and  as functions of
. Thus we can rewrite (18) as
()− () = ()() − 1 + 2()((())− (())) (19)
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and solve this equation for  which defines  and  . Then  and  can be found from (11) and (13):
 = () + (1−())( − )()  (20)
 = () + ()( − )()  (21)
The following result shows that the quality levels that occur in equilibrium with this model are lower
than the supply chain optimal values occurring with the score-uncertainty model.
Theorem 3 Suppose that the distribution of weights described by  is symmetric about a value . When
supplier  dominates supplier  from a cost perspective with ()  () for all , then in equilibrium
supplier  is selected more often than supplier  and  and  are both lower than the supply chain optimal
values ∗ and ∗ defined by
0(∗ ) = 0(∗ ) = .
Proof
Since 0  ()  () for all   0 with both  and  being convex, the tangent line of slope  for 
lies to the right of that for  for any   0. By considering the point at which these two lines cross the 
axis we have
()− (())  ()− (())
for any   0. But at equilibrium we know that (19) holds with  = ( − )( − ). Setting  = 
shows that
()
() − 1 + 2() 
1

and hence that ()  12. In other words ( )  12 as we require.
Moreover if ()  12 then by symmetry    and so 0() and 0() are both less than . Because
of convexity, 0 and 0 are increasing functions, and so   ∗ and   ∗ as required. ¥
Now we look in more detail at a specific case. We suppose that costs follow a power law with () = ,
() = , and so we have  = −1 = −1 . Thus,
() = (  )
1
−1 , () = (  )
1
−1 
So (19) becomes
(

 )
1
−1 − (  )
1
−1 =
()
() − 1 + 2() [(

 )

−1 − (  )

−1 ]
From this we can derive
()
() − 1 + 2() =

 
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or equivalently,
() = 1
2
− (1− 1 )() (22)
Suppose now that  is uniformly distributed on the range from 0 to 1, so () = ( − 0)(1 − 0)
and () = 1(1 − 0) within this range. Then (22) gives
 =  (0 + 1)
3 − 1 
provided that   0, i.e. 1  0 (2 − 1) . Therefore, solving  = 0() = 0(), we obtain
 =
µ 0 + 1
 (3 − 1)
¶ 1−1   = µ 0 + 1 (3 − 1)
¶ 1−1 
which shows that in this case the suppliers’ quality decisions are independent of the competition. Further-
more, the quality increases with the mean value of buyer weights and is independent of the uncertainty
1 − 0.
Substituting () () into (20) and (21), and rewriting we obtain,
 = (3 − 1) (1 − 0) + ( − 1) (1 + 0)
2(3 − 1) ( − ) + 
 
 = (3 − 1) (1 − 0)− ( − 1) (1 + 0)
2(3 − 1) ( − ) + 
 
Thus, given a fixed value of the average weight, (0 + 1)2, the prices that are oﬀered will decrease as the
amount of uncertainty (1 − 0) decreases.
In the case that  = 2 we have
 =
µ0 + 1
5
¶
,  = 31 − 20
5
( − ) + 2 
 =
µ0 + 1
5
¶
,  = 21 − 30
5
( − ) + 2 
Note that since we assume    we must have    . We have  = 2 (0 + 1) 5 and
() = 21 − 30
5(1 − 0) 
The final step is to check the conditions (15) and (16) that we require to ensure this is an equilibrium
(and undercutting does not occur). We can rewrite these conditions as
( − )
Ã
(31 − 20)2
25(1 − 0) −
21 − 30
5
!
 ( − )2 
( − )
Ã
(21 − 30)2
25(1 − 0) −
31 − 20
5
!
 ( − )2 
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After substituting for  and  and simplifying these inequalities become

µ21 + (1 − 0) (110 − 21)
5(1 − 0)
¶
  (0 + 1) 

µ20 + (1 − 0) (20 − 111)
5(1 − 0)
¶
 − (0 + 1) 
Writing the inequalities in this form shows that they will always be satisfied for fixed ,  provided
(1 − 0) is suﬃciently small. Moreover for fixed 0 1 provided 110  21 they will be satisfied by
making  suﬃciently large compared with .
For example when  = 2,  = 3 and we fix the average slope (0 + 1) 2 = 2, we have 1 = 4−0 and
so we need:
3
¡
(4− 0)2 + (4− 20) (150 − 8)
¢  40(4− 20)
2
¡20 + (4− 20) (240 − 44)¢  −60(4− 20)
These inequalities are both satisfied for 2  0  11095
We can illustrate what happens when the uncertainty in  values is too large by taking 0 = 1, 1 = 3
(retaining the values  = 2,  = 3). Then the solution is
 = 2
5
  = 38
75
  = 4
15
  = 22
75
 (23)
The slope of the line joining these points is 85 and this gives a probability of  being chosen of 07. In
equilibrium the profit made by  is
Π = 07 ¡ − 22 ¢ = 013067
However if  undercuts  at  = (2275)−  and  = 415 then player  can obtain a profit of
Π =
Ã
22
75
− 2
µ
4
15
¶2!
−  = 015111− .
So the solution (23) is not a true equilibrium.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider a supplier bidding situation where each supplier bids on the price and a number
of non-price variables and the buyer will then choose just one supplier. Assume the buyer has a linear
utility function involving scores of each supplier on bidding attributes and weights on these attributes. The
suppliers do not know the precise scores they will be given on bidding attributes; they may also not know the
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weights that will be used by the buyer. Both types of uncertainty are considered. In our first model, there is
uncertainty about how a supplier’s bid will be scored. Under the discrete choice framework, we reveal that
it is optimal for each supplier to bid the non-price variables in a way that is independent of the competitive
situation. We can say that supplier competition occurs only through prices, and non-price variables should
be bid at the values that would be chosen if there were no other bidders involved. This result holds with
remarkable generality, independent of the distribution of the uncertainty and only requiring cost functions
to be convex.
We have also shown that this result will hold when there is a two stage equilibrium with non-price
variables determined first and then prices set in a second stage. This model applies when considering vertical
diﬀerentiation (on quality variables) in a product market where consumers have the same willingness-to-pay
for quality but there is some additive random variation in utility (for example this occurs in a classic
multinomial logit model).
In our second model, there is uncertainty in relation to the buyer’s weights for bidding attributes. In this
case our analysis is restricted to the case with two suppliers and a single quality variable. We show that there
may not exist any equilibria, but that where there is an equilibria the quality levels chosen will be lower than
apply in the score-uncertainty model with weights set to their median values. Since the score-uncertainty
case gives quality levels that are chain optimal (given the final choice of supplier) this result suggests that
there is an additional welfare loss from weight-uncertainty in comparison with score-uncertainty.
Of course we would expect in practice to observe both weight and score uncertainty. From a discrete
choice perspective this is equivalent to the use of a Mixed Multinomial Logit (MMNL) model. By pulling
apart these two aspects of the uncertainty we have been able to give analytic solutions in important cases.
Taking account of both forms of uncertainty in a single model ramps up the complexity very substantially,
and it will be necessary to apply numerical techniques to find solutions in specific cases.
For particular examples with quadratic cost functions we have explored equilibrium solutions in more
detail. For these examples we find that (with both weight-uncertainty and score-uncertainty) smaller un-
certainty generally leads to lower prices; implying lower profits for the suppliers and a higher profit for the
buyer. This observation resonates with previous finding that uncertainty (on rivals’ costs) makes the equilib-
rium (of Bertrand competition) more competitive (Spulber 1995). This provides an additional argument for
transparency in the bid process from the buyer’s perspective: increased transparency will reduce the degree
of uncertainty experienced by the bidders, which in most cases leads to lower prices and more profit for the
buyer.
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